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Abstract 
This thesis consists of four papers. Articles I-III address gender aspects of land 
formalization and the role of land ownership for intra-household bargaining power. 
They draw on evidence from a land tenure reform in Madagascar implemented in 2005, 
a key component of which was to grant land certificates, i.e. private property rights to 
landholders. During fieldwork in Madagascar in 2011, I collected household survey 
data and conducted focus group interviews, mainly in the rural municipality 
Soavinandriana. In Articles I and II I assess the outcome of the reform in terms of 
securing women’s land rights, using a combination of econometric and qualitative 
methods. The analyses suggest that the certification program has strengthened both 
men’s and women’s formal claims to individually held land. However, there is bias for 
men’s land certificates. Policy makers presumed the land legislation to be gender-
neutral and therefore no gender equality principles and no mechanisms to ensure joint 
ownership were enforced. Problems of access, long waiting times, and high costs of the 
land administration were given priority over gender issues. The political crisis in 
Madagascar in 2009, resulting in underfunding and weak implementation of the reform, 
further weakened efforts to promote women’s rights to land. In Article III we 
investigate analytically and through numerical simulations how the intra-household 
bargaining positions of a couple are affected by the opportunity to title agricultural 
land, and how the couple's titling choice is determined. Results suggest that when land 
registration is offered to couples as a discrete choice between individual or joint titles 
there is a risk that women with weak initial bargaining positions will be further 
weakened following the reform. A joint title will only be chosen if the spouses start off 
with relatively equal bargaining positions; otherwise a male title will be chosen.  
In Article IV we compare the costs of livestock depredation by carnivores across 
different carnivore species – brown bear, wolf and lynx – and regions. We estimate the 
government’s compensation cost function, using Swedish data on county level in the 
years 2001–2013. Results indicate that costs are determined by the densities of 
predators, livestock, and alternative prey, the share of forest pasture, and the unit 
compensation level granted by authorities. Considerable differences in marginal costs 
between predator species and counties are estimated, accentuating the challenges facing 
policy makers trying to reconcile different policy objectives. 
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1 Introduction  
This thesis addresses various aspects of resource policy, gender and land rights. 
In Papers I–III I analyse – theoretically and empirically – the gender aspects of 
a recent land tenure reform in Madagascar, which has important implications 
for the livelihood of farmers. In Paper IV I shift focus to Sweden and a policy 
affecting Swedish farmers; a governmental policy on compensation for 
carnivore depredation of livestock.  
In the remainder of this section I give a background to the literature on 
gender, land rights and intra-household bargaining. I also present the case of 
Madagascar and my fieldwork and data collection. In section 2 I summarize the 
four papers, and in section 3 I make some concluding remarks. 
1.1 Background to the study of gender and land  
The introduction of gender analysis in the study of households in general, and 
of farm households in particular, has challenged and enriched many standard 
assumptions and concepts (Agarwal 1994; Deere, 1995; Kevane and Gray, 
1999; Razavi, 2009). In this section I address three standard assumptions that 
have been questioned in gender analysis, and their relevance to the study of 
land and land rights.  
First, the assumption of a male-headed family farm as the basic unit of 
production, with a male primary farmer is challenged. Gender studies show 
that, besides the fact that there are female-headed households, women 
contribute to the farm work and can be the primary farmer in couple-headed 
households (Deere, 1995; Razavi, 2009). Women hence play a more important 
role in farm work than accredited for in mainstream research, and in many 
cultures there are female and male farming systems, implying that women take 
care of some crops, men of other (Udry, 1996; Kevane and Gray, 1999).  
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Second, the assumption that the household acts as a single decision-making 
unit with common preferences, and a common household strategy rarely holds 
empirically. This common-preference, or unitary, model of the household was 
put forward in studies of households by for instance Becker (1981). 
Empirically, this model of the household is rejected in studies showing that 
there are negotiations and disagreement within households, and that power 
relations within the household matter for the decision the household takes 
(Alderman et al., 1994; Agarwal, 1997; Deere, 1995; McPeak and Doss, 2003; 
Lundberg et al., 1997; Vermeulen, 2002).  
Third, the assumption that the household pools all resources, and distribute 
them equally among its members is questioned. Numerous empirical studies 
reject the income pooling hypothesis (Deere, 1995; Attanasio and Lechene, 
2002), and show that the allocation of resources within the household impacts 
the expenditure patterns of the household (Thomas, 1990; Deere, 1995). 
Consumption is in general not equally distributed within households, but 
women typically consume less than men, and there is evidence that if a 
woman’s share of income increases this benefits the children to a larger extent 
than if the husband’s income increases (Folbre, 1986; Lundberg et al., 1997; 
Fafchamps et al., 2009).  
Land reforms are implemented across the developing world. The important 
contributions to the understanding of household dynamics summarized in this 
section all have implications for the study of land rights and land reforms, not 
least in Sub-Saharan Africa. First, the fact that both men and women are 
typically involved in agricultural work implies that women’s control over and 
access to land cannot be ignored (Agarwal, 1994; Deere and Doss, 2006). 
Second, in relation to the study of land, differences in preferences of household 
members imply that the control over land matters. Individual land rights have 
been in focus in the study of women’s land rights, but women’s access to co-
owned property and joint ownership is also crucial in many places (Deere and 
Leon, 2003; Walker, 2003).  Third, the differences in allocation of resources 
indicate that the power over the most important productive asset – land – can 
have important implications for the welfare of the household members.  The 
impacts of reforms depend to a large extent on the inclusion of both women 
and men, and the role of co-owned property (Razavi, 2007; Deere and Leon, 
2003; Deininger et al., 2008). 
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1.2 Intra-household bargaining models and the role of land 
rights 
The empirical evidence of different preferences of household members and 
their implications for household decisions has motivated the development of 
intra-household bargaining models. In this section household models and the 
role of land rights are discussed.  
The most prominent theoretical alternative to the unitary model is the 
collective bargaining model first proposed by Manser and Brown (1980) and 
McElroy and Horney (1981), in which a Nash bargaining process takes place 
between the household members. In contrast to the unitary model, this 
approach allows individual household members to have different preferences 
on the allocation of household resources. The Nash bargaining process hinges 
on the exit options, or threat points, of the agents. In a Nash bargaining game 
the parties maximize the Nash product, which is the product of the utility 
differences between the cooperative solution and the threat points for the 
respective agents. An agent’s threat point therefore determines her bargaining 
power. In intra-household bargaining models an agent’s threat point is typically 
his or her outside option if he or she would leave the household, as in for 
instance Manser and Brown (1980); alternatively, as in the Lundberg and 
Pollak (1993) separate-spheres model, the agents resort to non-cooperation 
within the household. This means that the household is not dissolved, but the 
agents create “separate spheres” within the households which constitute the 
threat points. Whitehead (1981) introduced interdependence between 
household members: the so called conjugal contract. This refers to the terms 
under which the household members exchange goods, income and services 
among themselves. Carter and Katz (1997) develop a conjugal contract model 
in which the spouses bargain over a monetary transfer from the husband to the 
wife, and labour time devoted to production of a household good, which gives 
utility to both spouses. The model is developed to represent a peasant 
household where the material basis for the interdependence in form of a fixed 
asset (land) is introduced. However, the authors do not elaborate on this 
specification of the theoretical model, and only consider individual land 
holdings in the production functions, not joint land holdings.  
The factors influencing the bargaining power of the individuals in the 
household have been investigated with a particular focus on the potential for 
empowerment of women. Some of these factors are wage rates, unearned 
income, shares of income, inherited assets, (for a summary see Quisumbing 
and de la Brière, 2000; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). A few empirical 
studies use land rights explicitly as an indicator for bargaining power, and there 
is growing interest in the role of the rights to co-owned property. In her study 
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of land rights Allendorf (2005) shows that the promotion of women’s land 
rights empowers women and benefit young children’s health in Nepal.1 Wiig 
(2013) focus on the role of joint land rights in a study of Peru, and shows that 
joint land rights contributed to women’s ability to participate in household 
decision making.  
There is however a gap in the literature between the theoretical intra-
household bargaining models and growing empirical evidence of the 
importance of women’s land rights for their empowerment, which we attempt 
to address in Paper III.  
1.3 Land, law and custom in Madagascar  
In this section, a broad introduction to the complexities of interests in land in 
Madagascar is given. Land acquisition strategies and regulations of relevance 
for individuals and companies are discussed. Inheritance and marital regimes 
are crucial for the allocation of land within households, and are also discussed.  
Madagascar is the fourth-largest island in the world, with a surface area 
of 587 000 km2, and a population of approximately 20 million. It is one of 
the poorest countries in the world, and three-quarters of the population live 
below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2010). About 80 percent of 
the households rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, mainly rice 
production and raising livestock. Madagascar was famous internationally in 
2009 when news were spread about the protests against what was described as 
land-grabbing by the international agribusiness investors Daewoo and Varun 
International, (Borras and Franco 2010; Andrianarinina-Ratsionalanana, 2011). 
The contracts included almost half of all agricultural land in Madagascar and 
spanned over 50 years, with seemingly unrealistic production goals. This 
risked leaving the contract farmers in poverty, and has been seen as the trigger 
of the political crises in 2009, when the president was forced to resign. 
Madagascar was for years to come governed by a transition regime, not 
recognized by the international community.  
Commercial interest in land from foreign investors is not a new 
phenomenon in Madagascar; during the French colonial period 1896–1960 the 
most fertile lands were expropriated by the colonial state. There has also been 
an interest in mineral resources for a long time. Recently however, attracting 
                                                        
 
1. The results depend on the context, and should thus be interpreted within current gender roles 
where women take greater responsibility for the welfare of the children. The emphasis on 
empowerment of women is a phase in striving for gender equality. 
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foreign investors has become an important policy priority and since 2005 over 
50 agricultural projects have been announced, as well as several forestry and 
large-scale mining projects. The crisis of 2009 led to many international donors 
and investors leaving the country, but there are indications that large-scale 
investments in land are increasing again (Andrianarinina-Ratsialonana et al., 
2011). The land deals have been seen as a sell-out of “tanindraza”, the 
ancestors land, to foreign investors; the rent for leasing land is about 1 
USD/hectare and year (United Nations, 2011). Andrianarinina-Ratsialonana et 
al. (2011) describe how land acquisitions have so far been non-transparent and 
top down processes, which have in general excluded local people; in particular 
people with weak land rights, such as women and people belonging to certain 
ethnic groups. There is a resistance movement requesting an immediate halt to 
evictions of the Malagasy people from their land, and that the authorities 
protect the land rights of families who have been living on their land for many 
years (Collectif pour la défence des terres Malgache, 2011).  
As discussed in Andrianarinina-Ratsialonana et al. (2011) it is difficult to 
verify land ownership due to technical problems such as the absence of a 
national level database, or map, showing the legal status of land. Across all of 
Madagascar, the state system and customary land management co-exist to 
some degree. The titling system, giving private property rights to land, was 
introduced by the French colonial state in 1896. At independence in 1960, most 
of the French colonial settlers left Madagascar but their land titles were still 
valid and often the land itself continued to be cultivated by former workers 
(Brès, 2007). As described in Teyssier et al. (2008) the procedure to get a land 
title is long and complicated. It involves 24 administrative steps, the average 
cost was about 1 400 000 Ariary (500 USD), and the average waiting time 6 
years. 400 000 titles were issued until 2005, on a total area of 170 000 ha, 
corresponding to only about 10 percent of concerned land. The title registers 
are rarely updated, and colonial titles remains an important problem for many 
Malagasy small-holder farmers, who cultivate land which might have been in 
the family since pre-colonial times, but to which they do not have the legal 
right.  
Customary tenure systems in which local leaders governed land allocation 
have evolved due to increasing pressure on land, new rules, and new actors 
(Jacoby and Minten, 2007). By tradition, land in Madagascar belongs to the 
ancestors, and the main mechanism for allocation of land in the customary 
system is still through inheritance (Evers et al., 2006). Another important 
mechanism to acquire land rights originates in the use of land (mise en valeur). 
As unused land is becoming scarce, purchase of land is becoming more 
important. The formal arrangements of land markets are poorly developed, and 
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strategies to secure land in response to the titling system evolved, most notably 
a quasi-formal system with sales acts, called “petits papiers”, issued by local 
authorities. The “petits papiers” have uncertain legal value, but have been 
widely used (Teyssier et al., 2008). 
Regarding allocation of land within the household, as discussed by 
Giovarelli (2006) and Ramaroson et al. (2010) women have social and cultural 
rights to own land, primarily land inherited from their father. However, women 
are inferior in status to men, and in general follow their husbands to work on 
his land. This makes widows a particularly vulnerable group, having no legal 
right to land inherited or purchased by the husband before the marriage. 
Women, in particular in rural areas, have a higher illiteracy rate than men, and 
less access to information. The heavy workload at home and traditional gender 
roles prevent women from participation in community activities, and from 
speaking up in public. It is even stated in the marriage legislation that the 
husband is the household head. Assets, including land, acquired during the 
marriage are common property, whereas assets acquired before the marriage or 
as inheritance is individual property. In case of divorce, which is only possible 
if one of the spouses commit a fault, common property should be equally 
divided between the spouses, or according to a sharing rule decided upon at 
marriage; whereas all personal assets are kept by the spouses respectively 
(Government of Madagascar, 2007-022). Civil marriage is common in the 
central highlands of Madagascar, whereas in the southern and coastal regions 
traditional marriage is dominant (ROR, 2008). The traditional partition in case 
of separation is two thirds to the man, and one third to the wife (Ramaroson et 
al., 2010); but under some circumstances women cannot keep any assets. 
1.4 The Madagascar land tenure reform  
The weaknesses of the land-titling system, not least the problems with low 
capacity and elite capture, in combination with an increasing number of 
disputes over land, motivated the comprehensive land tenure reform adopted in 
Madagascar in 2005. In this section the reform is briefly presented.  
The Madagascar land tenure reform aimed at improving access to formal 
property rights to land for the rural population, modernizing land services, and 
reforming the land legislation. A key element was the establishment of local 
land offices assigned to issue land certificates to applicants, against a fee. The 
land certificates can be individual, joint for couples, or so called consortium 
certificates which are issued to a group of land holders not forming a couple, 
such as a group of siblings.  
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No gender equality principles were adopted in the reform and no reference 
was made to intra-household allocation of land rights. In order to secure 
women’s rights to jointly held land, the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC), acting as donor, advocated mandatory joint certification for couples’ 
co-owned property. However, joint certification remained a voluntary measure 
and few couples have used the opportunity; the majority of land certificates on 
jointly held land are issued to men individually. There are no national statistics 
on joint certificates but case study data indicates that only a few percent of 
certificates are joint. 
In total approximately 80 percent of all land certificates have been issued to 
men, and 20 percent to women. Women typically certify land that is inherited 
or purchased by the woman individually. The political crisis and withdraw of 
funding in 2009 was unforeseen by many communes that could not finance the 
local land offices. Typically, households do not certify all their plots, mainly 
due to lack of financial resources. Another important constraint is that much of 
the land titled during the colonial period is still registered in the name of 
French colonizers. These financial and institutional obstacles to certification 
are common for men and women, even though economic constraints tend to be 
more important for female-headed households.  
1.5 Field work and data collection 
In order to investigate gender dimensions of the land tenure reform I conducted 
fieldwork in Madagascar from December 2010 to May 2011. As a first step, 
interviews were undertaken with key informants at the National Land Program, 
and persons who had been drafting the policy (André Teyssier in particular). 
Also, local land office (LLO) agents and users were interviewed during visits 
at about 15 LLOs in different parts of the country.  
Based on the information retrieved in this first stage of the fieldwork, a case 
study site was chosen: the commune of Soavinandriana. It has one of the very 
first LLOs, and has received the highest number of applications for certificates. 
It was installed with the support of the FAO which had identified the need for 
secure land rights in order for other agricultural extension services to be 
successful (Brès, 2007). Soavinandriana is located in the Itasy region in the 
central highlands of Madagascar, see map. The fertile land, with its volcanic 
soils, and the relative proximity to the capital, attracted colonial settlers and 
migrants. Soavinandriana consists of 33 fokontany and has about 50 000 
inhabitants. The population density is comparatively high, 180 inhabitants/km2 
and the population grows at a relatively high rate, thanks to relatively high 
fertility and a continuing migration to the area. 85 percent of the population is 
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involved in agricultural production. The most important crops are rice, manioc, 
maize, and some cash crops such as coffee, tomatoes and beans. Fishing is 
another important activity (Brès, 2007). Both men and women participate in 
agricultural production and the work on the fields, although there is a gendered 
division of tasks. Men typically work with cattle and preparation of soils. 
Women’s tasks are typically weeding and transplanting as well as household 
work and child care (Jarosz, 1997).  In Soavinandriana, as in most of the 
central highlands, women’s literacy rates are higher, women are better 
informed about their rights to common property (Ramaroson et al., 2010), 
inheritance regimes are more gender equal and civil marriage is more common 
as compared to other regions (ROR, 2008). 
The fieldwork and data collection in Soavinandriana took place in March 
and April 2011. First, the information about the applications for certificates at 
the LLO was registered in what is called the Soavinandriana Land Certificate 
Database 2011. It includes 2 237 applications made by 1 207 different persons, 
of which a random selection of 360 persons, including both men and women 
were drawn. The sampling procedure used to select 148 households without 
certificates, used as counterfactual, was random walk (United Nations, 2005; 
Martin, 2005). In addition, all households with a joint certificate were 
interviewed. Deere and Doss (2006) stress that individual-level data is 
necessary to capture gender differences in asset ownership within households, 
therefore both spouses in a couple were interviewed separately. In total 455 
men and 514 women in 511 households were interviewed.  
The household survey instrument included questions about all members of 
the households, the individual and household inheritance, assets and 
livelihoods.  Furthermore, there were land related questions about the 
characteristics of the plots, the rights to sell, rent etc., as well as questions 
about motivations and facts about land certification. The survey was held by 
the enumerators in Malagasy, and translated to French.   
Moreover, focus group interviews were conducted with women and men 
respectively, as well as local leaders and village elders (ray aman-drena), in 
two different villages with different characteristics with regards to pressure on 
land, distance to the commune center etc. There was also one focus group with 
local leaders from different fokontany. The discussions were held in Malagasy.  
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Figure 1. Map of Madagascar.2  
  
                                                        
 
2. Source: d-maps.com  http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=35061&lang=en edited by the 
author 
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2 Summaries of the appended papers  
2.1 Summary of Paper I 
The purpose of Paper I is to examine the land tenure reform from a gender 
perspective. In particular, I analyse the certification program issuing formal 
land certificates to landholders. Does the presumed gender neutrality of the 
certification program result in a gender-neutral outcome? This study is the first 
to make a quantitative analysis of land tenure in Madagascar from a gender 
perspective. Using case study data collected in the rural municipality 
Soavinandriana, I investigate the demand for and expectations on land 
certificates. The majority of the certificates are registered in the name of a man, 
about 20 percent are registered in the name of a woman, and very few are 
jointly registered by couples. I use a binary probit model to identify 
determinants for applying for a land certificate for men and women, 
respectively. The results show that women use the possibility to formalize their 
land rights, albeit not to the same extent as men. Women typically certify land 
that they have inherited individually, and female heads of households are more 
likely than married women to obtain land certificates. On the other hand, 
among couples there is a tendency to register jointly held land only in the name 
of the husband. Therefore, a probit model with selection is used to study the 
dynamics within couple-headed household. The results indicate that 
households where wives actually certify jointly held land have characteristics 
typically associated with women’s bargaining power.   
The aim of the land tenure reform in Madagascar is to reduce tenure 
insecurity; however, it is beyond the scope of this contribution to establish 
whether the reform has been efficient in this regard. Nevertheless, I discuss the 
potential links between the patterns of certification and women and men’s land 
tenure security. Land tenure insecurity is an important obstacle for smallholder 
farmers, who constitute the majority of the population in Madagascar, which is 
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exacerbated by the current trend of commercial pressure on land (“land 
grabbing”). An underlying problem is the discrepancy between statutory 
legislation and customary land management. These two factors affect land 
rights from outside the community/household and are referred to as external 
threats. An additional layer of tenure insecurity is facing women through 
gender inequalities in inheritance and marital regimes (internal threats).  
The paper specifically considers intra-household relations using the 
classifications by Stephen Leisz, Andrea Robles, and James Gage (1994) in 
primary and secondary landowners. A male household head typically has 
primary land rights (he can transfer rights by selling, bequeathing, or gifting, as 
well as having use rights), whereas women tend to have secondary rights (user 
rights, but limited transfer rights, often conditioned on someone else’s rights). 
The analysis suggests that the certification program has strengthened primary 
landholders’ formal claims to certain types of land, sometimes at the expense 
of secondary holders. From a gender perspective, the certification process was 
flawed; women are less likely to obtain land certificates in their name. 
Furthermore, the land tenure reform does not address some of the most 
important obstacles to land tenure security such as colonial titles or communal 
grazing land in relation to commercial pressure on land.   
 
2.2 Summary of Paper II 
In Paper II I investigate the reasons for the low number of joint certificates 
during the first years of the Malagasy land tenure reform. The analysis builds 
on fieldwork conducted in Madagascar in 2011. The rural municipality 
Soavinandriana is studied in detail, using survey data and focus group 
interviews. The analysis points out three main factors contributing to the weak 
role of joint certification. First, it has not been a political priority. The 
problems of access, long waiting times, high costs etc. in the titling system 
were considered more important to address in the reform process than gender 
issues. The land legislation was considered to be gender-neutral, and there was 
no strong national women’s movement to push the agenda of joint certificates. 
Second, the political crisis in 2009 resulted in underfunding and weak 
implementation. Since the donor most concerned with gender issues – MCC – 
left the project there has been little information and efforts to promote joint 
certificates. Third, a “traditional view” of the household, where the husband 
represents the household, dominates both among civil servants and rural 
households.  
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Securing shared property rights for women is crucial, particularly since 
widows do not have the legal right to keep land that is certified in their 
husbands’ names only. In 2013 Madagascar held the first general election since 
the 2009 coup d’état, and the new government may take the opportunity to 
address the weaknesses in the land tenure reform.  
This study serves as an important reminder that without effective measures 
to secure women’s land rights, men will to be the holders of formal rights.  
2.3 Summary of Paper III 
In Paper III we make an attempt to bridge the gap between the growing 
empirical evidence of the impact of formal land ownership on women’s 
empowerment and theoretical bargaining models. We present a theoretical 
household bargaining model building on the conjugal contract model 
formulated by Carter and Katz (1997). In our model couples work on their 
jointly held land producing agricultural goods, and also derive utility from 
being in the household. The spouses bargain over the division of income 
generated from agricultural production. Contrary to the separate spheres model 
of Carter and Katz (1997) the threat points in our model are divorce, in case of 
which the spouses keeps a certain share of the land each. This share of land 
determines their respective bargaining power, in combination with labour 
market opportunities or the cost of hiring labour to work on the land. In the 
next step, we introduce an opportunity to formalize land rights through land 
titles, either an individual title or a joint title for the couple. The choice of land 
title affects the threat points. We investigate – both analytically and through 
numerical simulations – how the couple’s choice is affected by different 
parameter values. Finally, the theoretical results are applied to the situation of 
Madagascar where a land tenure reform is ongoing. 
The key intuition from the theoretical model is that if the option of a joint 
title strengthens the female’s position too much, then it will not be chosen by 
the couple, even if it leads to the highest total utility for the couple. In practice 
this means that if a couple is offered the options of either joint titling or 
individual titling they will only choose joint if the spouses start off with 
relatively equal bargaining positions; otherwise all the land will be titled in the 
male’s name, thus weakening the female’s position compared to the initial 
situation. The application to empirical data on land suggests that the theoretical 
model gives accurate predictions for the Madagascar context. Case study data 
from the rural commune Soavinandriana collected in 2011 shows that the 
majority of land certificates were issued to men – also land that is jointly held 
by couples – whereas very few couples have opted for joint certificates. The 
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few couples with joint certificates are all civilly married, which implies that the 
wives can expect to keep more land in case of separation than if the couples 
would have been traditionally married. Hence, with a voluntary mechanism for 
joint land certification only women with strong bargaining power seem to be 
able to acquire joint ownership to household land. The article concludes that 
land tenure reforms need to take gendered patterns of ownership and decision-
making into account in order to guarantee equal rights for men and women to 
co-owned property. 
2.4 Summary of Paper IV 
The aim of Paper IV is to compare the costs of livestock depredation by 
carnivores across different carnivore species and regions. To this end, we 
estimate the government’s compensation cost function, taking into account the 
role that the populations of carnivores, livestock and wild prey play for 
depredation. We recognize that not only the population numbers as such, but 
also the physical possibilities for carnivores to actually get close to the 
livestock matters for the magnitude of depredation and hence for the 
compensation cost. We therefore account for the role of grazing on forest 
pasture with no fencing, as well as the stock of electrical fencing, for the costs 
of depredation. Finally, the design of the compensation scheme itself is 
considered, taking into account the development of the unit compensation of 
livestock losses over time.     
The study is applied using Swedish data on county level over the years 
2001–2013. Compensation costs due to depredation by three large carnivores 
are considered: brown bear (Ursus arctos), wolf (Canis lupus) and lynx (Lynx 
lynx). We limit the analysis to costs for depredation of farm animals, thereby 
excluding damages to reindeer herders, for which the compensation system has 
a fundamentally different design, see, e.g., Zabel et al. (2011). Among the farm 
animals, sheep is by far the most commonly attacked species, and therefore the 
focus of this paper (Elofsson et al., 2015). Costs for attacks by wolverines are 
excluded from the analysis as the wolverine primarily depredates on reindeer, 
and very few attacks on sheep have been reported. 
We use a mixed model approach with panel data in order to estimate a 
constant elasticity cost function. Possible differences in compensation level 
between counties are dealt with using Best Linear Unbiased Predictors, which 
give estimates of random effects for each county. The major contribution of the 
study, compared to Boman (1995) and Bostedt and Grahn (2008), is the 
consideration of landscape, county specific, and policy design factors for the 
analysis of the compensation cost function. Further, we contribute by 
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comparing marginal costs for predators, and livestock, across regions, which 
allows us to contrast national cost-effectiveness and farmers’ perspectives. 
Results indicate that the costs of compensation for depredation of wolf, lynx 
and brown bear are determined by the densities of predators, livestock, and 
wild prey, as well as the share of forest pasture, and the unit compensation 
level granted by authorities. There are considerable differences in marginal 
costs between predator species and counties. The results accentuate the 
challenges facing policy makers trying to reconcile the policy objectives of 
cost-effectiveness, conservation of large carnivores, and enabling pasture-
based farming across the country. 
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3 Concluding remarks  
In this thesis I analyse resource policies in various contexts. Papers I–III 
address the privatization process of land in Madagascar, from a gender 
perspective. The results indicate that the concerns about the neglect of gender 
analysis in agricultural research, raised 30 years ago, are still relevant. Note 
that there are parallels between the design of a policy reform, and the study of 
such a reform. While doing my research I was questioned by some of the staff 
administering the reform, about my choice of perspective. It was argued that 
there was no need to study gender, since the land legislation was “gender 
neutral”, i.e. allows for ownership by both men and women. However, as my 
research shows, this presumed gender neutrality resulted in a skewed outcome, 
where men benefited more than women from the reform. As highlighted in 
Paper II the gender bias of the land certification program was reinforced by the 
weaknesses of the implementation process. Lack of funding and an unstable 
political environment impeded the advancement of the certification program, 
and contributed to the neglect of, not least, the efforts to secure joint ownership 
for married women. In Paper III this observation is analysed in terms of an 
intra-household bargaining model; the first to explicitly model the effect of 
joint land titles on intra-household bargaining power.  
In Paper IV I shift focus to Sweden, where farmers face different 
challenges. Increasing numbers of Swedish farmers are affected by the 
presence of large carnivores, and the associated risks of livestock depredation. 
The state allocates funds to the county administrative boards, which are 
responsible for administering compensation to livestock depredation and 
subsidies for preventive measures against carnivore attacks. The results in 
Paper IV indicate that the compensation costs for livestock depredation by 
wolf, lynx and brown bear are determined by the densities of predators, 
livestock, and wild prey, as well as the share of forest pasture, and the unit 
compensation level granted by authorities. There are considerable differences 
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in marginal costs between predator species and counties. Part of the variation 
can be attributed to differences in implementation across county boards, due to 
availability of funds as well as interpretation of the regulations. For instance, it 
seems to matter how the application form for receiving compensation is 
formulated for the amount paid in compensation. The design of the application 
form was also an important factor for the outcome of joint certification in the 
Madagascar land tenure reform. Hence, seemingly neutral national policies 
might in their local implementation result in different outcomes for 
beneficiaries. Application forms might seem a trivial aspect of a policy, but for 
the beneficiaries/users their design can have life-long consequences. Overall, 
the results in this thesis point to the importance of the design and 
implementation of a policy in order to achieve the objectives of the policy. 
Furthermore, the results reflect the challenges facing policy makers trying to 
reconcile different policy objectives.   
With regard to future research, Paper I was the first study to make a 
quantitative analysis of the recent land tenure reform in Madagascar from a 
gender perspective. It was not possible to analyse implications of the reform 
for outcomes such as income distribution within couples or outcomes related to 
children’s health, which was my original ambition, due to the limitation in 
data. These kinds of analyses would be valuable for a deeper understanding of 
the role of land ownership in Madagascar today. In terms of analytical 
advancements, the intra-household bargaining model presented in Paper III 
could be adjusted and applied to different country contexts. The results in 
Paper IV, indicating that there are large differences in marginal costs across the 
different carnivore species and regions would be interesting to explore in more 
detail.   
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